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Abstract
This article argues that both flexible spectrum management and the concept of
reconfigurability do not eliminate the need for certain centralized controlling
entities, and even introduce a number of new entities performing regulatory,
commercial and technical functions. One such entity, the Cognitive Pilot Channel
(CPC), is presented, and different configurations of the CPC are outlined.
Subsequently, the potential impact of different CPC configurations on business
models for wireless services making use of such a channel is explored. The article
concludes that a hybrid model combining a meta-level CPC with operatordeployed channels might provide the best mix of technical and strategic control
for operators, and value for users.
Keywords: business modeling, flexible spectrum management, controlling
entities

1 Introduction
The concept of Flexible Spectrum Management (FSM) refers to a set of new and
dynamic procedures and techniques for obtaining and transferring spectrum usage
rights and dynamically changing the specific use of frequencies. Uncertainty
currently exists concerning the way in which flexible spectrum management will
be implemented. Without any doubt, different implementations will result in
different business models for offering reconfigurable services, so it is crucial to
all stakeholders to have an understanding about this relationship, and the potential
business configurations it might result in.
This paper seeks to provide an analytical framework for examining the influence
of FSM on the business models deployed for “Beyond 3G” (B3G) networks and
services, in the context of operational solutions currently being developed within
Phase II of the European FP6 project E2R.i This project is concerned with
reconfigurability of wireless networks and devices, which can be defined as the
changeable behaviour of wireless networks and associated equipment, specifically
in the fields of radio spectrum, radio access technologies, protocol stacks, and
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application services, and usually in response to dynamic changes in their
environment. In particular, this paper argues that, even within policy
environments making increasingly more use of market based mechanisms, and
even within reconfigurable systems where decision-making is highly
decentralized and in which real-time mechanisms for dynamic spectrum
management are used, there is a need for centralized controlling entities which
may fulfill a diverse set of roles. Subsequently, it introduces the Cognitive Pilot
Channel as such a controlling entity, and outlines a number of potential
configurations for deployment of the CPC. Finally, it evaluates in an exploratory
way the potential impact of these configurations on business models for CPCenabled mobile and wireless services.

2 FSM and the need for controlling entities
Diverse policy and regulatory evolutions are currently taking place in the
direction of more flexible forms of spectrum management. These evolutions
include the introduction of secondary trading of spectrum, as well as systems for
more flexible change of use of frequencies, and policies aimed at allowing and
regulating the use of opportunistic devices (i.e. devices intelligently taking
advantage of available spectrum) making use of software defined radio
technologies (i.e. radio systems which can be reprogrammed to tune to any
frequency band and receive any modulation across a large frequency spectrum) .
Steps to introduce these policies are being taken in a number of countries, and the
European Commission is working on a harmonised, EU-wide approach, for
example through its WAPECS policy. For an extensive overview of these
evolutions on a national and on a European level, we refer to Delaere and Ballon
(forthcoming).
Although the final objective of FSM is a situation where market players define the
best use for the spectrum they own, and where licenses change owners with little
or no regulatory intervention, this does not mean that all activity in the spectrum
domain becomes decentralised and bilaterally negotiated. On the contrary, we
argue that FSM in a reconfigurable context leads to a new set of risks and
challenges, some of which will need to be met by the use of existing and the
introduction of new, centralised controlling mechanisms. As an illustration,
Xavier and Ypsilanti (2006) discuss a number of concerns and costs which could
hamper the introduction of secondary markets. A number of these are clearly
related to a lack or bad functioning of centralised (i.e. transcending operator or
user level) instruments. The most relevant of these issues are 1) the provision
information to actors, 2) the mitigation of interference, 3) the coordination and
harmonization of frequencies, 4) measures against anti-competitive behaviour and
5) the pursuit of objectives of public interest and consumer protection (see also
CEPT‟s ECC (2006) report).
Concerning the need for information resources, diverse other studies confirm its
importance: a BNetzA study emphasises the need for an electronically available
central register of spectrum availability, license ownership and rights of use (WIK
2006:131) while Ofcom (2007) has developed three different databases for this
purpose. Pleas for centralized provision of information, related to middle-to-longterm spectrum availability and usage rights or related to real-time spectrum
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occupancy, can also be found in Weiss (2006), and in Chapin and Lehr
(forthcoming), who argue that “The cost and risk of characterizing spectrum use
can be reduced through establishing an information registry, which could be
governmental or private, for authoritative data about primary uses”.
Thus, the concept of Flexible Spectrum Management and reconfigurability,
present risks and challenges which could necessitate the introduction of central
controlling entities. Regulatory as well as business-related arguments exist for
their introduction. From a regulatory point of view, controlling entities monitor
compliance with policies and regulations, take action in case of violations, and
may also support public policy objectives. From a business perspective,
controlling mechanisms not only are enablers for more efficient spectrum
management (potentially leading to lower costs and higher revenues), but the way
in which they operate also helps to define the rules of the game for interacting
with competitors, acquiring spectrum, getting access to users etc. The hypothesis
following from this is that there are several „configurations‟ in which these
controlling entities may be deployed, and the configuration chosen has an impact
on the business models developed for the different wireless services that make use
of them.
As argued above, the primary function of central controlling entities is that of a
registry. In a more advanced form, these registries could become so-called pilot
channels, which not only contain all information on available networks and
occupied frequencies, but transmit this data to terminals in real-time so that these
can be reconfigured to connect to whatever service available on whatever
frequency. In this sense, these pilot channels can be seen as the first and foremost
enablers of any FSM constellation. The next section introduces the Cognitive Pilot
Channel (CPC) as an overarching, active registry entity, evaluates the possible
configurations for CPC, and analyses its potential impact on the business models
of mobile services that will rely on it.

3 The Cognitive Pilot Channel as a Controlling Entity
While contributing to spectrum efficiency, new scenarios for Dynamic Spectrum
Access make the operation of systems making use of radio frequencies much
more complex. One particular issue on the terminal side is that, when services are
changing frequencies and vice versa, these terminals do not know what services
are available, and where they are currently located, and would therefore constantly
need to scan the entire spectrum in order to determine this. Clearly, this would be
excessively power and time consuming. (Holland, Cordier et al 2006) Basically,
the problem constitutes a particular instance of a lack of information, similar to
the areas mentioned in the section above where this risk could compromise the
take-up of mechanisms for flexible spectrum management. In the same way that
insufficient data on spectrum licenses, leases, secondary use, trading activity etc.
may lead to low spectrum trading activity, high transaction costs and increased
interference, it may also effectively impede users to locate and connect to
services.
Equally similar to the need of central registries and supervising functions to solve
the information deficit, the problems of frequency, technology and service
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discovery could be solved by the establishment of another controlling entity. The
E2R project has introduced a concept for this, i.e. the Cognitive Pilot Channel
(CPC) (Holland, Muck et al, forthcoming; Perez-Romero et al, 2007). In its most
basic form, this would be an invariable –and, thus, easily detectable– frequency
through which the availability of services in certain geographic areas as well as
the frequencies used by these services can be communicated to terminals in realtime. This way, a terminal only needs to be “pre-programmed” to look for one
frequency band of the radio spectrum (contrary for example to current
GSM/UMTS cellular phones looking for services in the 800/900/1800/1900 Mhz
band, besides WiFi hotspots at 2.4Ghz and so on), after which a data stream on
this frequency informs the device on what services are available and what
frequencies these services use; the device can then switch to a specific frequency
to connect to a specific network. Besides this, the CPC could potentially also
communicate other data such as pricing information and (potentially time-variant)
usage policies, and could even be used to transmit missing protocols needed for
example to be able to connect to a new Radio Access Technology (RAT) or
enhance security. This way, a CPC would eliminate the need for continuous
scanning of the entire spectrum (which would be very time- and batteryconsuming), while allowing services and RATs to be changed without limits.
Moreover, if applied on a regional or global scale, a harmonized CPC frequency
could greatly improve the cross-border functionality of devices: whatever services
are deployed in a certain country or region, and whatever frequencies are locally
used for these services, the CPC transmits the necessary data to the visiting
terminal.
Looking at the traditional value chain for wireless services, the CPC is located as
a new segment in between the user/subscriber and the operator (including 2G/3G,
WiFi access point, WiMAX operators etc., and possibly also broadcasters using
Digital Terrestrial Television, DVB-H, 3G or other platforms) mediating
information between these two roles. For the sake of clarity, the business roles of
the operator (the offer of services to consumers with the associated functions) and
the logistic management of the physical network are taken together in the term
„operator‟ as it is used throughout this paper, even though these may be separated
in real life (e.g. in the case of Mobile Virtual Network Operators or MVNOs). A
role that may coincide with the CPC but can also be separate from it, is that of a
spectrum broker, which –with either the subscriber of an operator as a customer–
respectively provides retail and wholesale access to different Radio Access
Technologies. Finally, the regulator may also play an important role in the
ecosystem as it may incorporate the CPC role. Although other segments of the
value chain are, of course, equally crucial in the eventual build-out of CPCenabled services -not in the least those of content provider/aggregator/store and of
manufacturer (enabling devices to contact the CPC and to reconfigure
themselves)- the following, exploratory business impact analysis of the CPC will
mainly be centered about the relationships between these five roles:
user/subscriber, CPC, spectrum broker, operator and regulator.
The design of the most appropriate CPC is strongly dependent upon its business
model implications. From a business model design perspective, the main question
is how the design of CPC control (i.e. which actor will operate the CPC) will
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impact on the value created for its users. Three CPC controlling entities may be
imagined:
Every operator: when an exclusively in-band (i.e. making use of one
channel withing one of the existing RATs of an operator, e.g. its GSM
network) CPC entity is chosen, every operator deploys this entity and
controls the parameters for the information to be transmitted as well as the
usage policies. The operator will use one of his own networks to distribute
this information;
Intermediary: in case of an out-band CPC (i.e. a dedicated frequency not
linked to a specific RAT), the regulator could take up this centralized task
as a complement to existing informational and monitoring missions (e.g.
spectrum trading and secondary use registries). Transmission could
happen via a network owned by the government (e.g. many terrestrial
broadcasting networks), or via one or more privately operated networks
(e.g. as a universal service provision). Alternatively, new actors could be
added to the ecosystem which take up the role of providing an out-band
CPC, and providing it as a service to operators. These could be entirely
independent organizations, or a consortium of operators.
Hybrid architecture: as mentioned above, an out-band CPC operated by
either the regulator or an intermediary (making use of one or more
transmission networks) may be combined with an in-band CPC deployed
by every operator; this implies a hierarchical system;
The section below analyses how different implementations of the Cognitive Pilot
Channel may impact the business models for mobile and wireless services that
will operate under this controlling entity.

4 Business Model Implications of the CPC
Applying the basic business model design framework of Ballon (2007) to the
concept of a CPC, we distinguish three basic business model issues from an
operator and/or a user point of view. The three issues are:
Value network and customer control: this parameter firstly refers to the
degree of control that an operator, in a certain scenario for CPC
deployment, exerts onto the value network by combining essential
resources, integrating roles within the production and distribution process,
and controlling the different modules making up the design and
deployment of their service as well as the intelligence stored in these
module. Secondly, this factor defines to what extent the customer is tied to
a specific operator as a result of a particular CPC configuration (e.g.
through billing relationships and CRM), and the extent to which this
customer is locked into an operator‟s domain, i.e. whether it is possible to
make use of the services of different providers both from a technological
(interoperability) as from a strategic (discoverability of competing
services) viewpoint.
Cost and revenue structure: on the one hand, the basic question here is
how the different costs associated with starting up a service (including the
cost of the CPC) are divided over the different actors that make use of it,
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including investment costs (capital expenditure and R&D) as well as
operational expenses. On the other hand, this domain also aims to identify
how the CPC influences the way in which revenue is generated for
operators (direct/indirect, content/transport-based) and, more importantly,
whether or not revenue sharing mechanisms between operators need to be
established as a result of the introduction such a CPC entity.
User value: this refers to the influence of the CPC on how services being
delivered through market positioning (i.e. as complements or as substitutes
for other services), on the degree of customer involvement in the value
creation of these services, and on the type of value that operators intend to
reach through CPC-enabled services, i.e. operational excellence (costbased strategies), product leadership (quality-based strategies) or customer
intimacy (lock-in).
Although the limited length of this paper does not allow us to deeply present the
theoretical foundation of the different concepts mentioned above (again we refer
to Ballon 2007 for this), it is clear that an extensive body of academic literature
exists exploring and analyzing these concepts. Some key works on these topics,
on the basis of which the above classification was made, are Hawkins (2001),
Faber et al (2003), Bouwman & MacInnes (2006), Haaker et al (2004),
Osterwalder (2004), Wehn de Montalvo et al (2005), Robertson & Langlois
(1994), Lee (2006), Shapiro & Varian (1999), Treacy & Wiersema (1993),
Bouwman (2003) and Porter (1979, 1985).
Analysing these three questions, we can now determine CPC impacts for the three
deployment scenarios, i.e. the operator, intermediary and hybrid system. These
three scenarios represent a specific and logical configuration of technological,
architectural, strategic and regulatory choices (such as in-band/out-band, one or
multiple layers, ownership of layers and degree of harmonisation).

4.1 Operator-based system
In this first scenario, all operators have their own in-band CPC which
communicates directly with user devices. For example, an operator O1 deploys a
2G and a 3G cellular network over a given territory, as well as Wireless Local
Area Network (WLAN) hotspots in selected urban meshes. The operator‟s SIM
card contains the frequency information for the CPC of O1, to which the device
always connects at start-up. Then, depending on RAT availability and the service
requested, one of the three networks is automatically chosen, after which the
device switches to the communicated frequency and connects to this network.
Seamless handover could be provided so that, again for example, a 2G voice call
could be switched to WLAN Voice-Over-IP (VoIP) whenever the terminal comes
within the range of a WiFi hotspot. Such handovers could also be initiated by the
operators when certain networks become congested. At the same time, operator
O2 deploys a combination of WiFi and WiMAX access points, and has its own
CPC to direct its subscribers to the frequencies used.
In this scenario, value network control as well as customer control will inherently
be significantly higher than in other configurations, and comparable with the
existing situation for 2G/3G services, in which SIM-cards or packages with
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locked terminals ensure a fixed relationship between customers and operators.
Large parts of the value network are controlled by one party, which also possesses
the technical and customer-related intelligence residing within these roles. This
intelligence could include data on spectrum availability for the array of RATs
offered by a specific operator, terminal usage profiles, billing history, location
data etc. Users might switch between the networks available but continuously
remain within the domain of one operator; in this sense, the CPC‟s function is not
extended to that of a marketplace or broker, but rather forms an integrated
component of the operator‟s infrastructure which enables A) increasing spectrum
efficiency for that one operator, thus reducing Capital and Operational
Expenditure (CAPEX/OPEX), and/or B) value to the user by allowing the
discovery of multiple RATs which may then be used either as part of an “always
best connected” subscription service or on an ad hoc basis. This added value
offered to the user is complementary: the different networks on offer are not
owned by different operators and therefore do not compete with the objective of
substituting each other, but are selected in view of the requirements posed by a
specific service, or of efficiency considerations by the operator. The fact that the
CPC resides within the domain of the operator also results in easy transmission of
data to the entity (since it is controlled and trusted), eliminates negotiations and
conflicts between operators and potential intermediaries, and might also make the
technical infrastructure easier to maintain.
In terms of cost and revenue, this scenario is highly concentrated. Being the sole
owner and user of a CPC, the operator will need to have the necessary usage
rights for CPC spectrum as well as have access a transmission network with wide
area coverage. Moreover, it needs to be noted that, if all operators have their own
CPC, investment and operational costs, as well as the costs associated with
harmonization, are to be multiplied by the number of CPCs to be deployed. This
might render these costs prohibitive, in particular for smaller operators that do not
have a large customer base and/or national coverage, such as WLAN hotspot
operators, and therefore result in CPC-enabled dynamic spectrum access only
being used by existing large-scale operators that in many cases already offer a mix
of licensed and unlicensed RATs to their customers. On the other hand, revenues
are also concentrated within one actor, since the CPC is an integrated part of the
operator, so that no intermediary needs to be compensated.
It is clear that such a CPC deployment would be part of an operator‟s strategy
aimed at intimacy with the consumer: it will give the demanding user no
opportunity to subscribe to competitors, but instead offer him increased
connectivity, with an in-house RAT available for the different types of service
requirements the user might have.

4.2 Intermediary-based system
In the second scenario, an intermediary party deploys an out-band CPC. Two
variants are possible: in a first one, the government takes up the role of
administering a single CPC covering the entire territory, while in a second variant,
several out-band CPCs are launched as commercial services by new actors.
Subsequently, operators may have their networks with the respective frequencies
listed on the CPC of one or more intermediaries, in order to reach as many
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potential customers as possible. In the case of private intermediaries, different
marketing strategies could thereby be imagined, for example the use of premium
fees for top listings or the grouping of different RATs by one operator under one
heading. This is also reflected in the different strategies that an intermediary can
adopt towards the user: besides just offering a real-time list of available networks,
premium packages may also be proposed, in which the broker actively looks for,
suggests and (for example with the help of a software agent installed onto the
terminal) even reconfigures the device to use the network that best meets certain
pre-set requirements such as price, bandwidth, QoS etc.
In this scenario, the CPC would contain essential information on different RATs
available from different operators in a specific mesh. Since it is not a hierarchical
system, the user‟s device would switch directly from the meta-CPC to a specific
service on a particular frequency. With only one level and limited capacity on the
CPC, this implies that choices will need to be made with regard to the granularity
of the system: on the one hand, an efficient channel aimed at maximizing
competition between operators and technologies would contain not only the
different licensed and unlicensed RATs deployed by major network business
owners, but also local hotspots for (mostly unlicensed) technologies operated by
small, independent providers. However, this may crowd the CPC with information
on relatively small networks with a mixed degree of capacity, accessibility and
reliability, so clearly a trade-off will need to be made here.
Contrary to the operator-based system, value network control as well as customer
control are low when regulators or private intermediaries administer the CPC.
Firstly, the CPC is not vertically integrated but resides outside the domain of the
operators, acting as an intermediary role between customers and operators. Since
the operators do not own the CPC, they are bound to transmit only that
information which the intermediary requires from them, and have to offer this
information on the CPC together with data from other operators. This makes it
difficult for operators to lock in subscribers to their services. A way for operators
to solve this, would be to programme the device such that it filters out from the
CPC only those networks offered by a certain operator, thereby significantly
increasing customer control. However, this implies that an a priori customer
relationship exists between operator and consumer, that the operator is still able to
lock terminals in the same way that it does today, and that the consumer is willing
to accept that any RAT available on the meta-CPC but not belonging to its
operator is unavailable, even though his device would support the technology.
By not being part of the operator‟s infrastructure, the CPC is also not a source of
customer intelligence for the operators, but on the contrary acts as a data flow
barrier between subscribers and business owners. For the user, the CPC –if
unfiltered– acts as a neutral regulated marketplace of services; however, as any
other market the CPC will function imperfectly if consumers do not have the
information needed to make a rational choice –implying that data is not only
needed on RATs and services but also on their functionality, reliability and price–
and/or if barriers to market entry (i.e. CPC access) are too high. This again refers
to the degree of granularity wanted, and the measures to obtain it. Also, a
fragmentation of intelligence might create an information deficit for users,
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comparable to searching any other service that is available via different brokers.
Finally, CPC data will need to be gathered from different operators, transmitted in
real-time to one or more CPC entities, transformed into a single CPC data stream
and then again transmitted over a separate CPC network. Given the sensitivity of
the data, this fragmentation of intelligence –and responsibility– is likely to
increase conflicts.
As far as cost is concerned, it is the intermediary which needs to procure the
necessary funds for the establishment of the CPC as well as provide a budget for
its operational expenses; in case the regulator acts as the only intermediary, no
spectrum rights need to be purchased and maintained for different operators, and
no license needs to be obtained and financially maintained for the out-band CPC.
In terms of revenue sharing, the case is different for the two variants. If the
intermediary is the government, it will not need to be compensated for the
advantages provided by a CPC. However, if one or more private identities cover
costs associated with running the service (second variant), these intermediaries
will need to earn back these costs by taking a share of the revenues realized by its
customers. These customers might be end users, who pass part of their savings on
operator and service fees onto the broker. Alternatively or concurrently customers
might be operators, who pay simply to be listed onto the intermediary‟s CPC
platform and/or to occupy premium spots on that platform. In both variants,
however, this scenario makes the CPC more interesting to smaller operators than a
decentralized system, and are likely to spur competition between a large number
of operators with diverging networks and services.
Another clear difference from the operator-based model lies in the nature of the
value that is proposed to users. Having to compete with various other operators on
the CPC with often duplicate technologies and services, the value will be defined
in terms of how they could substitute rather than complement competing RATs
and services. For example, a user can consult the CPC for available WLAN
networks and select the operator which best suits his requirements (cost-persecond, cost-per-bit, signal strength, speed, or a combination of these). As a result,
operator strategies cannot solely be based upon increasing intimacy. Instead, they
will more likely be positioned as being cost-effective or quality-ensuring.

4.3 Hybrid system
As mentioned, a fourth and final possible configuration of the CPC could be a
hybrid system, consisting of one out-band meta-CPC combined with different,
operator-level in-band channels. In this hierarchical scenario the out-band CPC,
operated by either the government or by an intermediary private party,
communicates to devices only the location in the spectrum of the operators‟ inband pilot channels. After having scanned the meta-CPC for the locations of the
different operators, the user selects a specific operator, whose in-band CPC is then
consulted for the networks on offer, or the device autonomously receives network
and frequency information from multiple in-band CPCs to increase the choice of
networks. One of the main advantages of this configuration is that, while giving
operators full control over their own pilot channel, only one CPC channel needs to
be harmonized and known a priori by the device; all the other frequencies,
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including that of the different in-band CPCs and of the networks that they list,
may change dynamically as allocations and assignments are altered.
Because of the hybrid architecture, value network control and customer ownership
are on an intermediate level. By keeping part of the CPC entity within its own
domain, the operator has the flexibility to communicate any information desired to
the customer and, from the moment that its CPC has been selected, has a direct
relationship with this customer. However, the upper hierarchical level resides
outside of the operator‟s domain and may function as an open marketplace. As in
the regulator-based system, operators could still lock in users by reaching
contractual agreements which allow them to have the terminals filter out only
their CPC from the meta-channel; however, it remains to be seen to what degree
customers as well as terminal manufacturers will allow such control. In any case,
modularity and distribution of intelligence are higher, making the system as a
whole more complex to handle than a single-CPC model, while giving more
control to the operators than in the regulator or intermediary-based models to
manage their own channel.
A similar evaluation can be made for cost and revenue models. Both will be
mixed, as investments and operational expenses will need to be made on two CPC
levels, of which one will reside within and the other outside of the operator‟s
responsibility. Therefore, as in the operator-based model, operators will have to
bear the cost of setting up and maintaining a CPC, which plays to the advantage of
larger actors with have more financial resources and more RATs to advertise via a
single in-band channel. An advantage over the operator-based model, however, is
that these in-band CPCs do not need to be harmonized and may be located on
whatever suitable frequency band that is available, probably rendering these
frequencies more affordable for smaller operators. As for revenues, these may be
entirely transferred to the operators, or may have to be shared with an
intermediary if this actor is responsible for setting up the meta-CPC. Therefore,
both the operator-based and intermediary-based financial analysis with regard to
revenue models may be valid, depending on the type of hybrid model selected.
A variety of possible strategies can also be noted with regard to the proposed
value. For example, an operator could use SIM locking to lead customers to their
in-band CPC (intimacy strategy), and subsequently promote different RATs as
complements to each other: GSM for QoS-guaranteed voice and SMS
applications, WLAN for low coverage, high bit-rate data transmission and
seamless handover to UMTS in case the connection with the WLAN network is
lost. Alternatively, users could purchase a device without any a priori subscription
to an operator, and use a combination of out-band CPC and several in-band CPCs
to discover substituting services within (e.g. competing WLAN networks) or
across technologies (e.g. GSM voice services versus VoIP over WLAN) based on
quality and/or price considerations. If the meta-CPC is deployed by an
intermediary, users could subscribe to an active brokerage service by this
intermediary, in order to always be redirected, via one of the operator‟s CPCs, to
the cheapest or best network available for the desired service; operators could in
their turn make agreements with intermediaries to get top-of-list advertisements.
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5 Conclusions
In this article, a short overview has been given of policy trends towards more
flexible forms of spectrum management. We have argued that both flexible
spectrum management and the concept of reconfigurability, although distributing
decision-making and intelligence on spectrum allocation and assignment, do not
eliminate the need for certain centralized controlling entities, and even introduce a
number of new ones. One such entity, the Cognitive Pilot Channel, has been
presented here, and three different configurations of the CPC have been outlined.
Subsequently, we have explored the potential impact of different CPC
configurations on business models for wireless services making use of such a
Cognitive Pilot Channel. The three domains of analysis and the respective values
for the different CPC configurations can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: Overview of CPC domains of analysis
domain of analysis
1.

2.

3.

control

cost and revenue structure

user value

domain aspects

operator

intermediary

hybrid

value network control

high

low

medium

customer control

high

low

medium

cost distribution

centralised

centralised

both

revenue distribution

concentrated

both

both

product positioning

complement

substitute

both

intended value type

intimacy

mix

mix

This analysis has shown that, while giving large scale, multi-RAT operators
significant advantages in terms of value chain and customer control, product
positioning and revenue concentration, the operator-based scenario does not seem
to optimize value for customers and create a maximal degree of competition
between actors and technologies. Such degree of competition (inter-broker, interoperator, and inter-technology) and of user value types is clearly present in the
intermediary-based model, however operators might have too little control over
the architecture and of their customers, and the practical complexity of the system
might be too high for them to support this configuration. Also, harmonization of
the necessary frequencies might be problematic in both the operator and the
private intermediary configurations. For these reasons, a hybrid model might
perhaps be the best choice, because it limits harmonization issues and allows a
competitive market of CPC-enabled services to develop, while also giving
operators sufficient technical and strategic control. However, as the evaluation
made in this study is exploratory in nature (since, for example, no exact
estimations of cost and revenue, or harmonization feasibility and roadmaps can be
made at this time), further research in all three domains of analysis as well as
policy and regulatory analysis will need to be undertaken.
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